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SUMMARY 
The adequacy of household saving for retirement has become a policy issue all around the world. The UK and 
US have been in the vanguard of those countries that have tried to encourage retirement saving by providing 
tax-favoured treatment for particular savings accounts. We consider empirical evidence from these two 
countries regarding the extent to which funds in some specific tax advantaged accounts (IRAs in the US, 
TESSAs and ISAs in the UK) represent new savings. Our best interpretation of this evidence is that: only 
relatively small fractions of these funds can be considered to be ‘new’ saving and so these policies have been an 
expensive means of encouraging saving; there has been some deadweight loss from the policies associated with 
‘reshuffling’ of existing savings. Continuing improvements in data on individual financial behaviour create 
scope for future empirical analysis of incentives to save, both within the standard economic framework that we 
explain and exploit, and by considering extensions to and adaptations of it. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
With ageing populations and shorter working lives generating increasing pressure on public finance 
and pension systems, the adequacy of household saving for retirement has become a policy issue all 
around the world.  As successive reform to public pensions makes such systems less generous, there 
is an increasing role for individual provision in retirement income, which in turn generates a need for 
households and individuals to save more. 
One way governments have traditionally tried to encourage retirement saving is by providing special 
tax arrangements, or tax incentives, for funds held in particular types of saving accounts. Whilst these 
tax advantaged savings products may only provide a tax treatment for saving that is neutral with 
respect to consumption, it is usually the case that they still provide a tax advantage over other forms 
of saving such as interest bearing accounts, direct holdings of equity, or intermediated products such 
as unit trusts or investment trusts and therefore increase the (marginal) rate of return to saving.  
In order for such tax incentives to achieve their stated goal of increasing or encouraging saving, it 
must be the case that the saving level responds positively to an increase in the net rate of return. If 
that has to be the case, the funds going into such accounts need to have come from individuals 
reducing their consumption levels as opposed to simply moving money from one form of saving to 
another. As a result the simple size and take-up of such schemes is not a reliable indicator of their 
effectiveness as a policy instrument in increasing personal and household saving. Instead the 
evaluation of their success is somewhat more complicated, as it should consider what the same 
households that are taking up these schemes would have saved in their absence. Moreover, if one is 
interested in the effect of these schemes on national rather than personal savings, one has also to 
consider the implications for government saving that is affected through the reduced tax liabilities 
implied by these schemes. Obviously, these are not simple issues and have been the subject of much 
empirical research.   
In this paper we consider the empirical evidence from two countries, the US and the UK, regarding 
the extent to which funds in some specific tax advantaged accounts represents new saving. Both 
countries have historically been at the forefront of those adopting tax incentives for saving, with the 
first products being introduced over fifteen years ago. We begin by setting out a broad and simplified  4
theoretical framework in order to more precisely describe the effects that we will be looking for in 
our empirical analyses; we then move on to consider the US and the UK experiences in turn.        
2.  HOW ARE TAX INCENTIVES SUPPOSED TO WORK? A SIMPLE THEORETICAL 
OUTLINE 
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework which we find useful to organize our ideas 
about the economic rationale for tax incentives to saving. In addition, we briefly discuss other 
possible channels through which saving schemes that have a tax incentive might be helpful in 
increasing saving, independently of the strictly economic effects.  
Introducing a tax advantage to a saving instrument is, in most cases equivalent to a modest increase in 
the rate of return to that particular asset. The reason why we say ‘modest’ is that many of these 
schemes are associated with a tax deferral or at most a partial tax exemption, rather than being 
entirely exempt from taxes. Resources put into assets can generally be taxed at three points: income 
may be taxed before an individual has the opportunity to allocate some of it to saving; returns may be 
taxed when they accrue as capital gains or interest or dividends; and withdrawals from the asset may 
be taxed. Assets that are not tax advantaged are generally taxed in the middle (return) phase, and at 
either of the end points. Using ‘T’ for ‘Taxed’, and ‘E’ for ‘Exempt’, such tax regimes may be 
described as TTE or ETT. The ‘partial’ exemption on tax-favoured assets usually relates to the middle 
(returns) phase.  That is, individuals might be exempt from taxes on the income that is contributed to 
a given scheme (often within a certain limit), and on (some of the) returns to their asset, but they are 
subsequently taxed when resources are drawn from that asset, typically at retirement: they thus face 
an EET tax regime. Alternatively, if interest payments, capital gains, and withdrawals are untaxed, 
then contributions to such accounts typically need to be made out of taxed income thus giving a TEE 
tax schedule. The tax favoured accounts we consider in the empirical sections of this paper 
encompass both EET and TEE types - the former design is that followed by the Individual 
Retirement Account in the US; the latter is that of the TESSA and ISA in the UK and the ‘Roth IRA’ 
in the US. Since the two designs are equivalent if marginal tax rates are constant over the life-cycle we 
do not distinguish between the two in this section.   5
An increase (modest or otherwise) in the rate of return on a specific asset will have two effects on the 
decisions of a saver. On the one hand, it might change the total amount that an individual will save. 
On the other, given the amount saved, it will change the composition of the optimal portfolio and, 
presumably, will shift resources towards that particular asset.  
Whether a tax incentive works in stimulating savings concerns mainly the first effect, that is, if the 
total amount saved is larger than it would have been in the absence of the tax incentive. In a standard 
model, the answer to this question is in general, ambiguous. As is well known, there is an income and 
a substitution effect at play. On the one hand present consumption is more expensive relative to 
future consumption, which should increase current saving. On the other, the amount that it is 
necessary to save to achieve a given level of wealth is reduced. When there are more than two 
periods, there is also a wealth effect that tends to increase savings. To fix ideas, consider the following 
stylized model. Our consumers live for four periods and face no uncertainty. We label the four 
periods as 0, 1, 2 and 3. Decisions at time 0 have already been taken and are reflected in the initial 
value of wealth, A1. Preferences are given by an intertemporally separable CRRA utility function. The 
typical household receives income y1 and y2 in periods 1 and 2 and nothing in period 3. The tax 
incentive operates by increasing the after tax return on assets, r. In the case in which this return is 
equal to the discount factor (δ), the consumption profile is flat: c1=c2=c3. To formalize, we have the 
maximization problem:  
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A first order condition for this problem is given by the following:  













Using these equations and the intertemporal budget constraint one can solve for the level of 
consumption in each period. Consumption in period 1 is given by the following expression:   6





























































Equation (1) is useful because it relates consumption in period (1) to the level of resources available 
to the individual in the future  (income in period 2 discounted by the interest rate) and those currently 
available to her. The latter consist of current income and current assets (which reflect decisions taken 
in the past). From expression (1) it is apparent that the effect of changes in the interest rate is, in 
principle, ambiguous. In the case of log utility (ρ=1), income and substitution effects in the 
denominator exactly cancel out, so that one is only left with the wealth effect (the fact that future 
income is discounted more heavily at high levels of the interest rate), so that consumption goes down. 
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher than 1, the effect of an increase in the 
interest rate is unambiguously negative. 
While this simple model is very stylized it can be used to interpret some of the evidence we present in 
the next section. There we compare the rate of consumption growth for consumers who contribute 
to a tax-favoured scheme in both of the periods that we consider, to that for consumers that start 
contributing after the first observation of consumption. We will call them ‘continuing’ and ‘new’ 
contributors respectively. In terms of our simple model, we compare a consumer who has already 
contributed to the tax favoured scheme in period 0 to one that starts contributing in period 1. Such a 
consumer experiences a change of interest rate in period 1 of their life. If there were no contribution 
limits, such a consumer would shift all of her existing assets to the tax favoured scheme. But she will 
also change her consumption.  The direction and size of this change depends on the size of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/ρ), but if the tax-favoured scheme is to increase saving then 
it must be negative. On the other hand, a household which is already contributing to a tax free 
scheme will not change consumption as it will not experience a change in the interest rate. Therefore, 
if we compare the consumption changes from period 0 to period 1 for the continuing contributor 
and the new contributor, one would observe a smaller rate of growth for the latter than for the 
former if the tax-favoured scheme is effectively increasing saving. Moreover old contributors would 
have already shifted existing assets to the tax-favoured scheme. Therefore we are likely to observe a  7
smaller rate of growth (even a negative one) for non-tax favoured financial assets for new 
contributors than for continuing contributors. 
These arguments were used by Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) in their study of the effect of Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) in the US, one of the first tax favoured schemes introduced. In the 
following section we reproduce some of their results. The effect of participation in the IRA program 
on consumption is ambiguous and depends upon the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The 
model, however, can also be used to study the possible effects of different tax favoured schemes. And 
one can easily introduce contribution limits and the like to the basic structure. The main message that 
comes out of this standard economic framework is that, considering financial incentives, the effect 
that tax favoured schemes might have on consumption is bound to be relatively small and is not even 
unambiguously positive. Of course this is not to say that tax-favoured schemes of a different nature 
could not have any other effects on saving. One might want to consider different channels through 
which these schemes could operate in generating new saving.  
First, there is the information and economic literacy channel. One example of a tax-favoured scheme 
using this channel is those 401(k) accounts in the US that provide financial education and information 
through employer provided workshops and seminars. These might be effective in increasing saving if 
some participants in the scheme are made more aware of their financial needs in retirement and of a 
necessity to direct extra resources to retirement saving. While a discussion of these issues is beyond 
the scope of this paper, we should note that schemes that work through extensive use of financial 
literacy seminars and workshops over a prolonged time period, can be very expensive. Second, if one 
believes that the model above does not constitute a good approximation to individual behaviour 
because many individuals behave irrationally, then alternative justifications for the schemes can be 
important. For instance, if self-control problems contribute to the ‘inadequacy’ of retirement saving 
patterns, then one might think that consumers with these problems may be induced to save more in 
such schemes since the penalties typically involved in withdrawing funds from a tax-favoured scheme 
provide a commitment mechanism. While these ideas move away in a substantive fashion from the 
model we have considered here, in that they assume that consumers are not fully rational in their 
intertemporal endeavours, they have received some support in the literature, especially in the case of 
401(k)s.   The implications of such channels for the design of optimal incentives are not completely 
obvious. The rate of return advantage, for instance, might not be as crucial as often implied in the 
policy debate.  8
3.  EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT 
ACCOUNTS IN THE USA 
In this section, we reproduce some of the evidence in Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) on the 
effectiveness of IRAs in generating new savings. While IRAs had been available for a number of years 
in the US to self-employed individuals, they were made available to all households in 1982. The 
scheme involves a considerable tax advantage in that contributions to an IRA are exempt from 
income taxes. There are however, limits to the contributions, which during the period of our data 
could not exceed US$2,000 per year for any working individual and US$2,250 for a couple with only 
one employee.   
As we mentioned above, Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) compare both the change in consumption and 
the change in non-IRA financial assets of the ‘new’ and ‘continuing’ contributors. They use data from 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a continuous and reasonably comprehensive survey started in 
1980. In this survey each household stays in the sample for four consecutive periods each lasting a 
quarter of a year, and reports expenditure on all consumption items over the most recent period in a 
retrospective interview at the end of the quarter. The survey is particularly useful for the purpose at 
hand, because it is available around the time at which IRAs were made universally available. In the 
sample, therefore, we are able to see a relatively large number of individuals who join the scheme 
between the first and fourth interview. One can therefore compare how consumption (and assets) 
change for ‘continuing’ and ‘new’ contributors. As the legislation changed again in 1986, we focus in 
particular on the period 1982-1986. Indeed, the first few years were the most interesting both because 
one can find many ‘new’ contributors in the data as the scheme started to become popular and 
because differences between ‘new’ and ‘continuing’ contributors in this period were probably due to 
information or other random events and are less likely to be driven by systematic differences in 
consumption growth that might obscure the results.  
The empirical specification Attanasio and DeLeire (2001) use to implement the test based on 
consumption consists of the following simple equation: 
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where ) ln(
i
t C ∆  is the change in log real consumption for household i observed at time t.  X   i
c is a 
vector of controls discussed in the results section and d   i
new is a dummy variable that equals one for 
the households that started contributing during the interview period and δi equals one if household i 
is observed between 1982 and 1986 and zero if it is observed after 1986. Under the null that the IRA 
incentives did not generate new saving, the coefficients γ
c should be zero. We allow the coefficients to 
be different before and after 1986 to reflect changes in the IRA legislation in that year. While 
equation (2) is in logs, and therefore focuses on proportional changes in consumption, in the 
empirical application we also estimate it in levels.  
In Table 1a, we report the results for the log specification. In addition to the OLS results, we also 
report the results on three quantile regressions: the 50
th, 75
th and 90
th. For each of these, we report the 
results of a specification that controls for income and income growth and one that does not. While 
these variables might be endogenous, it might also be argued that people start contributing to an IRA 
when they receive a positive income shock.  
The coefficient on new contributors is not significantly different from zero in any of the specifications 
that we report. Furthermore, in most specifications the point estimates are positive rather than 
negative. This evidence that consumers who start contributing to an IRA do not seem to be reducing 
their consumption provides a strong case to argue that IRAs created little, if any, new saving during 
our sample period. In Table 1b, we report the results for the specification in levels, which are broadly 
consistent with those in Table 1a. The only exception is the point estimate for the early period in 
OLS specification (1), which is negative. However, the coefficient is small from an economic point of 
view (around 175 dollars) and not significantly different from zero. 
  10
Table 1a 
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Income Growth 
 












































































































Note:  P-Value reports the results of a Wald test that the two coefficients are equal. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Controls include: number of children, number of seniors, education dummies, race dummy, age dummies, regional, monthly and 
yearly dummies are not shown.   
 
Table 1b 
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  87.0 
(116.0) 
 























Note:  P-Value reports the results of a Wald test that the two coefficients are equal. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. . 
Controls include: number of children, number of seniors, education dummies, race dummy, age dummies, regional, monthly and 
yearly dummies are not shown.    11
 
Table 2 




Not controlling for Income Growth 
 











































































































Note:  P-Value reports the results of a Wald test that the two coefficients are equal. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Controls include: number of children, number of seniors, education dummies, race dummy, age dummies, regional, monthly and 
yearly dummies are not shown.   
 
In Table 2, we report the results for a regression that puts saving rates (rather than the change in 
consumption) on the left-hand side. Saving rates are obtained as income minus consumption divided 
by income. The change in the savings rate combines both the change in consumption and the change 
in tax liabilities when we control for income growth.  In order to isolate the change in tax liabilities 
and the change in consumption from any change in income, it is essential to control for income 
growth. Thus, we favour the specifications that do so. However, in an attempt to isolate the effect of 
a reduction in tax liabilities (that are directly related to the participation in the IRA program) from 
other changes in income, we control for growth in before tax income.  
The results are somewhat mixed. The first four columns, which do not control for income growth, 
show that the change in saving out of after-tax income is on average 17% greater for new 
contributors than for continuing contributors.  The median, 75
th percentile and 90
th percentile 
changes are also large and are all statistically significant.  The last four columns, however, control for 
before tax-income growth.  In all of these specifications, the change in saving out of after-tax income 
is not statistically different for new and continuing contributors. While it is logically possible that  12
households financed a portion of their IRA contribution out of reduced tax liabilities we can only 
find weakly suggestive evidence that this is the case. 
The figures in Tables 1 and 2 are interesting in that they are the only results in the literature on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives to saving that consider directly the effect of these schemes on 
consumption. As we mentioned above, however, one can also look at what happens to the change in 
non-IRA financial assets for new and continuing contributors. In Table 3, we report Attanasio and 
DeLeire’s results for a specification that relates the change in non-IRA financial assets to a number of 
controls and the ‘new- contributor’ dummy.  
The results indicate that new contributors accumulate non-IRAs financial assets significantly less than 
continuing contributors. The OLS estimates (for the 1982-86 period) are particularly suggestive, as 
the difference is about 2,000 dollars, which is the limit to annual IRA contributions.   
This second test is also particularly interesting as a complement to the consumption based test 
because it sets the hypothesis of ‘no- new saving’ as the alternative, while the consumption based test 
set it as the null. As it happens, the results of the two tests are both consistent with the hypothesis 
that the IRAs were ineffective in creating new savings.  
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Table 3 
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Note:  P-Value reports the results of a Wald test that the two coefficients are equal. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Before moving on to evaluating the likely effect that this legislation has had on national savings, it is 
worth mentioning that the evidence above has sometimes been misinterpreted. In particular, the 
evidence on the changes in assets has sometimes been interpreted along the following lines. The 
figures in Table 3 show that ‘continuing’ contributors accumulate non-IRA assets at a faster rate than 
new contributors. As new contributors will become continuing contributors (there is evidence that 
shows that most new contributors will keep contributing) they will start accumulating wealth in the 
same manner as ‘continuing’ contributors and therefore save more. Therefore IRAs work as an 
incentive. Such reasoning is flawed. The only thing that Table 3 shows is that the stock of non-IRAs 
assets grows less for new contributors than for continuing contributors. The most likely cause is that 
new contributors are re-shuffling existing portfolios into the IRAs. Continuing contributors may 
eventually exhaust this source of funds and so begin to substitute within their flow of saving. The 
crucial evidence is that in Tables 1 and 2: they show that new contributors do not decrease 
consumption and do not increase saving rates. This directly illustrates an absence of the effects 
necessary if the tax-favoured scheme is to generate new saving.  
The estimates we obtained can be used, together with some strong assumptions, to estimate the effect 
that the IRA legislation has had on national saving. As we have two different estimates, one obtained 
from the consumption (and saving) specification and one from the asset specification, we can also  14
check, as an additional test of our approach, whether the figures we obtain are internally consistent. 
This is what we do in Table 4. 
Table 4 
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  Reduction in Non-IRA 




*  56% 1957 62% 1957 62% 
  Reduction in Tax Liabilities  1110  35%  1110  35%   938
* 38% 
Percent of IRA 




      
  New Household Saving
1 
 
44% 38% 38% 
     Of which is   
     New National Saving 
 
 9%  3%  9% 
  Reshuffled Assets  56%  62%  62% 
* This number is calculated as the remainder.  
1 New household saving is the reduction in consumption plus the reduction in tax liabilities. 
 
We know that, in our sample, the average contribution to IRAs was equal to 3170 dollars. These must 
come from: (i) a reduction in consumption; (ii) a reduction in tax liabilities; (iii) a reduction in pre-
existing financial assets. We are able, to impute the marginal tax rate for each household in our 
sample, and therefore to compute the reduction in tax liabilities induced by their IRA contribution. 
This turns out to be 1100 dollars. The most generous estimates for the reduction in the level of 
consumption (275 dollars, although not significantly different from zero), implies (together with the  15
other two figures) a reduction in non-IRAs financial assets of 1785 dollars, which compares to our 
estimate of 1957 dollars. Equivalently, if we start from our estimates of the reduction in non-IRA 
assets, we find an implied reduction in consumption of 103 dollars, which is remarkably similar to our 
estimates.  
From these simple computations we can draw two lessons. First, the evidence from the two tests 
presented is remarkably consistent, making them credible. Second, the contributions of the IRA 
legislation to new saving is minimal.   
 
 
4.  THE UK EXPERIENCE 
 
The UK has an extended history of using tax incentives to encourage saving in various forms. Most 
important for our purposes is the evidence concerning two particular tax-exempt savings vehicles: 
Tax Exempt Special Savings Accounts (TESSAs) and Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs). Both of 
these products allow individuals to save over a short time horizon, as well as to fund their retirement. 
What the schemes have in common with Individual Retirement Accounts is that they allow income 
and capital gains accruing to funds held in the accounts to be received free of tax, and so aim to 
promote private saving through increases in the net rate of return. 
TESSAs were introduced in 1991 and were subsequently replaced by ISAs in 1999 (i.e. no new 
TESSAs could be opened once ISAs had been introduced). Over the intervening period the 
remainder of the savings environment was, in the context of recent UK savings policy, relatively 
stable. In particular, the three-tier system of pension provision was already established. The first tier 
was comprised of a Basic State Pension, supplemented by means-tested benefits for those with low 
entitlements and/or little additional income. At the second tier workers could choose between a state 
earnings related pension or (tax privileged) private provision either in the form of a personal pension 
(introduced in 1988) or, where available, an occupational scheme. The third tier consisted of 
additional voluntary savings to supplement provision from the lower tiers. Though not strictly 
speaking retirement savings vehicles, TESSAs and ISAs are accounts opened voluntarily and over and 
above any wealth accumulated through the pension system, and so can be considered as part of the  16
third tier. The stability of other savings arrangements, coupled with the relative short time horizons 
within which we analyse the effects of the TESSAs and ISAs, allows us to consider each policy 
reform largely in isolation from other institutional factors.
1  
When TESSAs were introduced it was already possible to make some short-term savings in a tax-
privileged form using a Personal Equity Plan (PEP). As the name suggests, funds held in PEPs had to 
be held in equities although these could be held either directly or in trust. Contributions into PEPs 
were paid from net income, but relative to other means of holding shares the accounts were tax 
privileged since any interest income or capital gains accruing to the fund was tax exempt.
2 
Contributions to TESSAs were also paid from net income but in contrast to PEPs these accounts 
provided tax relief for interest income accruing to funds held in designated bank or building society 
deposit accounts. Also unlike PEPs, this tax advantage could be received only if the capital remained 
untouched for five years; early withdrawals would pay back the tax advantage but attracted no further 
penalty. 
ISAs replaced both TESSAs and PEPs from April 1999. The ISA is a tax privileged savings vehicle 
for cash deposits, or for holdings of stocks and shares either directly or in trust, or for both cash and 
equities. Like both TESSAs and PEPs, contributions to ISAs are paid from net income. The absence 
of a statutorily fixed holding period is the main difference between a cash ISA and a TESSA. The 
option of holding cash or safe interest bearing accounts and so avoiding stock market risk, is what 
differentiates the product from a PEP. Like TESSAs and PEPs before them, ISAs were restricted in 
terms of the total amount that could be invested in an account in any one year. Indeed, the 
introduction of ISAs actually reduced the maximum amount that an individual could save in a tax 
advantaged non-pension form. An individual holding a TESSA and a PEP could save up to £7,800 a 
year in these accounts, or £9,000 if the TESSA was in its first year.
3 ISA saving is limited to £7,000 
per year, of which at most £3,000 can be in cash. However, as evidence indicates that the median 
holding of non-pension financial wealth amongst families in the UK was around £1,000 in 2000 
(Banks, Smith and Wakefield, 2002), even the stricter contribution limits of ISAs are unlikely to 
constrain many savers, particularly amongst those with lower incomes who were a target for the new 
policy.
4 ISAs can be seen as giving expenditure tax treatment on all accessible savings for the majority 
of households in the UK.   17
In the context of a discussion of tax-advantaged products and their impact on savings, both TESSAs 
and ISAs can be seen as an expansion of tax exemptions that increase the interest rate available on 
some part of a saver’s assets. TESSAs were the first product that allowed individuals in the UK to 
save from net income and pay no tax on returns to a simple cash deposit account. The advent of 
ISAs meant that savers could for the first time pay no tax on the returns to their savings made from 
net income without having to either sacrifice liquidity or bear stock market risk. We now look at 
evidence to try and uncover whether or not these expansions of tax exemptions did increase saving 
through the mechanism discussed in the theoretical section of the paper. To anticipate, our 
conclusion is consistent with that from the IRA reforms in the United States: there is little evidence 
that the policies had strong effects in generating increased saving.  
Aggregate evidence on the effectiveness of TESSAs 
A lack of detailed individual or household level data on wealth before 1995 makes a detailed analysis 
of the effects of the introduction of TESSAs infeasible. Instead we simply report summary evidence 
from the aggregate statistics which suggests a high degree of reshuffling of portfolios. Take-up of 
TESSAs was initially high, as shown in Figure 4.1. Immediately on their introduction, two million 
policies were taken out, representing just under one in ten households. Subsequently, the number of 
accounts rose steadily through the period and by their abolition in 1999 well over five million 
accounts were active. Since each account lasts for a fixed five-year period the stock of TESSAs held 
declined steadily in the following years as the accounts expired.  
Figure 4.1 here 
Looking at the time series of TESSA ownership it is clear that there was an early period of rapid 
adoption, between 1991 and 1993, after which growth in ownership rates was steadier (with the 
exception of a final short sharp increase in 1999 which is a ‘pre-abolition’ effect). Remembering that 
there were fixed contribution limits, it is natural to ask what happened to average balances in this 
period. In the first year of a TESSA individuals were allowed to contribute £3,000, and in each 
subsequent year contributions were limited to £1,800, although subject to a total five-year limit of 
£9,000.  18
Figure 4.2 uses data on the stock of wealth held in TESSAs, combined with data on the number of 
active accounts, to show the average size of TESSA balances over the period. A striking pattern 
emerges. Over the period of early adoption, and indeed in the two subsequent years, there are discrete 
jumps in the average balances each time a new financial year begins. Although average balances do 
not increase by the entire amount of the increasing contribution limit it is clear that for the initial 
years at least, balances are close to the maximum they could be. Such evidence, and particularly the 
discrete jumps in balances associated with relaxation of constraints, are strongly consistent with 
reshuffling behaviour. More specifically, in the early years of an account the annual contribution 
limits effectively constrain the overall balances that can be held in the account. Each April an 
individual becomes eligible for another year of contributions which consequently raises the total 
amount that can be held in the account and therefore allows more reshuffling to take place, up to the 
point that balances in other forms of saving are available to be transferred. Such a pattern of large 
contributions at the beginning of the year, followed by no further contributions for the rest of the 
fiscal year, would be not typically be associated with reduced consumption patterns. 
Figure 4.2 Here 
Following this episode, once TESSAs had been established and the first five year accounts were 
beginning to mature and possibly ‘roll over’ into follow-on accounts, there was a period of 
remarkable stability in average balances which continued until the accounts began to expire post 
1999. Once again, although robust statements are difficult to make given the lack of micro data and 
the absence of an appropriate counterfactual, this would be consistent with the build up of TESSA 
balances having been mainly reshuffling. Given that evidence on the distribution of wealth suggests 
that stocks of assets are limited relative to five-year contribution limits for the majority of households, 
if the funds flowing into TESSAs were arising from reshuffling, then TESSA balances would begin to 
plateau as the funds available begin to run out. This seems to be exactly what happened as the system 
of TESSAs became more established through the mid 1990s. 
The final episode takes place post 1999, and is less easy to interpret directly. Following the abolition 
of TESSAs and their replacement with ISAs there is a period when average balances fall steadily, in 
parallel with falls in the number of active accounts. Two possible interpretations present themselves. 
Firstly, this could be a selection effect — those who took out TESSAs early (and hence whose 
TESSAs expired early) may typically have had higher balances than those who took them out late.  19
Secondly, however, this decline in average balances could have reflected marginal saving (or even 
marginal reshuffling) being directed into ISAs even for those who had a TESSA account. Such 
behaviour would have been rational (given equal pre-tax rates of return) since ISAs provide the same 
tax advantage as TESSAs but without the liquidity restriction.  
The period around the replacement of TESSAs with ISAs is clearly instructive for evaluating tax 
incentives for saving. This is also a period where some micro data on savings and wealth holding was 
available in Britain, so it is this evidence which we turn to next.  
Micro-evidence on the effectiveness of ISAs 
To reiterate what was said above, the introduction of ISAs effectively created expenditure tax 
treatment on all accessible savings for the majority of households in the UK. Compared to the tax 
favoured savings products that preceded them, ISAs offered greater flexibility in terms of accessibility 
of funds and the ability to hold cash. In order to make an initial analysis of whether or not ISAs 
encouraged saving, perhaps particularly among those with moderate incomes who were a target for 
the policy, we present some “group based” descriptive evidence of the limited micro-data on 
individual and family savings that is available for the UK. We split the sample into education groups 
defined to roughly measure whether the individual has only compulsory level schooling, advanced 
level school education, or some college education. Education might be thought to better capture 
lifetime resources than a control for current income, and unlike income, in our sample of non-students 
education is also not likely to be determined at the same time that current savings choices are made. 
We also split the sample into 10-year age bands in order to look at whether or not the new savings 
product attracted younger savers.     
Our main data source is the “Family Resources Survey” (FRS). The FRS is an annual survey of 
households in Great Britain, which collects data on the economic resources of a cross section of 
households. It takes a representative sample of the population of private households across Great 
Britain
5, and samples around 40 000 individuals from around 28 000 families
6 or 22 000 households, 
each year. In addition to its large sample size and the detailed information it provides on personal and 
family characteristics, the FRS is useful for our purposes because it contains detailed information on 
which financial assets individuals hold. It also records banded information on whether the individual  20
thinks that the balance of funds in all accounts held between themselves and their spouse/partner is: 
less than £1 500; between £1 500 and £8 000; between £8 000 and £20 000; or greater than £20 000. 
 
Table 4.1: Percentage of families holding tax-free financial assets  
  Age group   
  <30 30s 40s 50s 60s 70+ All 
Age ceased education:  1998/99   
School leaving age  3.3 7.3 7.5 18.8 20.5  9.6 10.5
Age 18  7.1 15.6 19.5 33.4 38.8 24.8 23.1
Age 19+  12.0 27.4 37.1 52.3 60.1 56.1 32.9
All 6.5 14.9 20.5 30.9 32.1 17.4 19.2
         
 2002/03   
School leaving age  8.4 14.3 18.6 26.6 32.7  22.0 19.8
Age 18  14.7 29.3 31.3 42.8 54.7 42.3 35.8
Age 19+  28.1 43.3 47.3 63.0 68.9 68.5 46.6
All 16.0 26.9 31.1 41.4 45.4 32.6 31.2
         
  Percentage point increase:   
School leaving age  5.1 7.0 11.1 7.9 12.2  12.4 9.3
Age 18  7.5 13.8 11.8 9.5 15.9  17.4 12.7
Age 19+  16.1 16.0 10.2 10.6 8.7  12.4 13.7
All 9.5 12.0 10.6 10.5 13.3 15.2 12.0
Source : Authors’ analysis using the Family Resources Survey. As in all subsequent tables using FRS 
data, totals are grossed up to be more representative of population totals, but this makes little 
difference to the figures and ungrossed numbers are available on request from the authors. 
In the introduction we argued that evidence of high take-up of tax-favoured assets cannot be 
interpreted as a reliable indicator that these products are successful in encouraging new household 
and personal saving. Nonetheless, in table 4.1 we consider how family level ownership of tax  21
favoured financial savings products (TESSAs and PEPs, and subsequently ISAs) changed between 
financial year 1998/9 – immediately before ISAs were introduced – and financial year 2002/03, which 
is the most recent available year of FRS data. These data are interesting because the disaggregation 
into education and age groups allows one to see whether ISAs were particularly highly taken up by 
families in the groups for whom the new product was thought to be particularly attractive. More 
pertinently for our attempt to assess of the effectiveness of tax incentives in increasing saving, these 
data also provide a useful benchmark for our subsequent analysis. In particular, in our subsequent 
analysis we can look at whether or not the groups with high take-up of ISAs also increased their 
overall ownership rates for non-pension financial assets, and/or the amount of financial saving that 
they were doing.           
Since an ISA could (subject to limits on amounts saved) be used as an almost perfect substitute for 
TESSAs and PEPs, but also offered greater flexibility than its predecessors, one would (all else equal) 
expect to see an increase in the proportion of families holding these assets. The data in table 4.1 
indeed show quite substantial percentage point increases in ownership of these assets, and the data in 
the appendix show that the pattern is similar if the data is analysed at the adult rather than family 
level.
7 These increases do not seem to be confined to lower education groups who were thought to be 
a key target of the reform, but are seen across all groups. If the increases were considered in 
percentage (rather than percentage point) terms, then there is evidence of the effect being weakly 
skewed towards younger and lower education groups: the increases for the two low education groups 
in the youngest age band represent a more than doubling in ownership. Evidence of this kind can be, 
and in some government publications has been (see chapter 5 of H.M.Treasury, 2000), interpreted as 
suggesting that ISAs were more attractive to lower income savers than TESSAs and PEPs had been. 
On the other hand at least one study that has used micro-data to examine the effects of ISAs argued 
that the products were little better than TESSAs and PEPs at reaching some low-income groups 
(Paxton, 2003). Both of these studies may have understated the difference in reach of the different 
products by comparing stock levels of ownership for the more established products (TESSAs and 
PEPs in the late 1990s) to those for ISAs in only their early years.     
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Table 4.2: Percentage of families holding any financial assets other than a current account  
  Age group   
Age   <30 30s 40s 50s 60s 70+ All 
Age ceased education:  1998   
School  leaving  age 39.1 49.5 49.6 62.2 66.9 67.4 55.6 
Age 18  56.2  75.7  72.6  82.6 81.9 83.0 75.1 
Age 19+  67.7  83.5  88.7 92.2 90.5 91.4 82.5 
All 51.0  65.5  70.4  76.1 75.4 73.9 67.6 
         
 2002   
School  leaving  age 33.2 50.1 52.3 59.1 63.7 65.9 53.8 
Age 18  48.3  71.4  70.3  78.1 80.6 78.8 71.4 
Age 19+  64.5  79.5  85.1 89.9 89.8 91.7 79.8 
All 46.7  64.4  68.0  73.9 73.3 72.3 65.6 
         
  Percentage point increase:   
School  leaving  age -6.0 0.7  2.7  -3.1 -3.2 -1.6 -1.7 
Age  18  -7.9 -4.4 -2.4 -4.5 -1.3 -4.2 -3.7 
Age  19+  -3.3 -4.0 -3.7 -2.2 -0.8 0.3  -2.7 
All  -4.3 -1.2 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 -1.6 -2.1 
Source : Authors’ analysis using the Family Resources Survey. 
If the evidence of an increase in ownership rates for tax favoured savings products were 
supplemented by evidence of an increase in ownership of assets more generally, then this would 
support the notion that ISAs might have encouraged some new savers. Table 4.2 looks precisely at 
whether or not the ownership of all non-pension financial savings products (all accounts except 
current accounts) rose between 1998/9 and 2002/3. In this case there is no evidence of an increase, 
and in most groups ownership rates actually fell over the period, and (again data presented in the 
appendix show a similar pattern for adults as for families). If anything, the decline was biggest in the 
youngest, lowest education groups. While it is possible that the decline would have been more  23
dramatic in the absence of ISAs, the combined evidence of tables 4.1 and 4.2 strongly suggests that 
many people who held ISAs in 2002/03 were simply reallocating or “reshuffling” assets that they 
would have held in other accounts if ISAs had never been introduced. 
 
Figure 4.3 here 
  
Table 4.3: Percentage of families holding more than £1500 in financial assets 
  Age group   
  <30 30s 40s 50s 60s 70+ All 
Age ceased education  1998   
School leaving age  12.8 24.0 27.5 45.2 56.5  58.7 37.4
Age 18  20.8 43.6 48.4 64.8 76.3 75.5 54.0
Age 19+  33.5 60.7 69.6 78.9 84.0 90.9 61.1
All 20.9 40.2 48.7 60.1 67.8 66.6 48.5
         
 2002   
School leaving age  12.8 26.7 33.1 47.1 58.6  61.8 40.3
Age 18  19.3 45.8 52.4 66.6 77.0 78.6 56.8
Age 19+  35.7 63.6 72.8 81.5 90.9 93.2 64.8
All 22.0 43.4 51.7 63.5 70.0 70.4 51.8
         
  Percentage point increase:   
School leaving age  0.0 2.6 5.7 1.9 2.1  3.1 2.9
Age 18  -1.6 2.3 4.0 1.9 0.7  3.1 2.7
Age 19+  2.1 2.9 3.3 2.6 6.9  2.3 3.7
All 1.2 3.2 3.1 3.4 2.2  3.8 3.4
Source : Authors’ analysis using the Family Resources Survey.  24
Even if it is the case that the advent of ISAs had little impact on asset ownership rates across 
education and age-groups in the population, the policy could still have been successful in encouraging 
new saving if those who were saving began to save more after the new instrument was introduced. 
We therefore need to consider data on the amounts that people save. Figure 4.3 and Table 4.3 (with a 
corresponding adult-level appendix table A3) exploit the FRS data which records in broad bands the 
level of family wealth held in non-pension financial assets. Both the aggregate data in the figure and 
the grouped data in the table show evidence of a slight increase over time in the proportion of 
families with more than £1500 in these assets. This increase seems to have been experienced fairly 
uniformly across groups. There are at least two reasons why it is hard to interpret this data as 
evidence of increased saving due to ISAs. The first is that over time inflation would have eroded the 
real value of £1500 of nominal wealth: to compare families with more than £1500 of nominal wealth 
in 2002 to families with the same real value of wealth in 1998, one would need to observe how many 
families had more than around £1390 of wealth in the earlier year,
8 but this information is not 
contained in the FRS. Additionally, the FRS data measures a stock of wealth whereas we would like to 
observe the flow of wealth going into these assets. In order to get a measure of this flow that can be 
presented in real terms, it is necessary to use a second dataset, the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS).           
 
Figure 4.4 to go here 
 
The British Household Panel Study is a survey of around 10 000 adults in around 5000 households 
(or 7000 families).
9 The same households are interviewed annually although as in any panel study, 
some respondents drop out of the panel.
10 Like the FRS the survey asks participants about a wide 
range of personal and family characteristics including educational attainment and age. Although 
somewhat less detailed information is elicited on income sources, the BHPS does ask interviewees 
whether or not they maintain some savings by “putting something away” from their income. Those 
who answer “yes” to this question are then asked to estimate “About how much on average do you 
personally manage to save a month?” It is the information contained in answers to this question that 
we exploit here.   25
Figure 4.4 shows that, with the exception of the occasional upwards movement for the highest 
education group, there is little evidence of growth in the real (2002) value of average monthly saving 
in financial assets by families in our BHPS sample between 1991 and 2001. Only for the highest 
education group do average savings rise above their 1998 level in the years after the introduction of 
ISAs, and that only in 2001, the final year of our data. Furthermore, for all the education groups, the 
data underlying this chart show that the proportion of families saving anything at all peaked in 1997 
or 1998, just before the introduction of ISAs. On the face of it there seems to be little evidence of an 
effect of the introduction of ISAs on the amounts that families in the BHPS were saving in financial 
assets.    
Figure 4.5 to go here 
 
Finally, figure 4.5 combines FRS and BHPS data in an attempt to provide a visual assessment of how 
the increase in the number of families holding tax-favoured savings products between 1998 and 2001 
was related to the changing average levels of saving by families. There seems to be no clear pattern to 
the points displayed on the chart, although there are too few data points to scientifically assess 
whether or not there is a relationship such that average savings went up more (or down by less) in 
groups with stronger movements into tax favoured assets. Nonetheless, the fact that there are some 
groups with high take-up of the tax-favoured assets and big declines in average savings suggests that 
the introduction of ISAs certainly was not enough to offset other factors that may have been acting 
to depress saving levels.   
Overall, this descriptive look at the data suggests that while the take-up of ISAs was quite high, there 
is no strong evidence that this had much affect on overall ownership of non-pension financial assets 
or on levels of saving among those with such assets. This evidence, particularly on ownership, is 
consistent with reshuffling behaviour of the kind observed in the US with IRAs. 
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5.   CONCLUSIONS AND THOUGHTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The evidence presented in this paper for IRAs in the US, and TESSAs and ISAs in the UK, suggests 
that, at the most, only relatively small fractions of the funds going into tax-advantaged savings 
vehicles can be considered to be ‘new’ saving. As such, the best interpretation of the evidence is that 
such policies are expensive ways of encouraging savings. In addition, to the extent that the reshuffling 
of assets leads to a reduction in the tax liabilities without any real change in economic behaviour, 
there is some deadweight loss associated with such policies. Additionally, since those with the greatest 
reshuffling possibilities are the wealthiest members of society, these policies will typically have some 
distributional impact. A priori we would expect these factors to be biggest for IRAs and TESSAs, 
where the liquidity restriction would be likely to discourage savers with low wealth from participating. 
As such the introduction of ISAs in the UK is an important episode, showing, as it does, that even 
when such accounts do not include minimum holding periods the extent to which they encourage 
genuinely new saving is limited.       
The standard economic framework that we used in this paper to describe the likely effects of the 
financial incentives of tax-advantaged savings products, assumes rational and informed behaviour. It 
is of course possible that such a model is not adequate and that individuals need either information or 
commitment devices to make the right intertemporal decisions. But if that is the case, and the ‘if’ 
looms large here, then it is not obvious that rate of return advantages, that can be expensive in terms 
of government revenue, are relevant for these other channels to work. Much work is needed to assess 
the extent to which individuals make the ‘wrong’ decisions, and the possible importance of employer 
programmes, self-control, financial education, awareness, advertising, and government endorsements 
in changing such decisions. Particular types of arrangements may work, and may be responsible for 
what new saving we do observe in the products we considered above (and particularly in other 
products such as 401(k) in the US, and Personal or Stakeholder Pensions in the UK which we have 
not considered here). 
The evidence presented above is limited in its scope by the nature of the data and policy variation 
available to researchers. In recent years, substantial progress has been made in the use of 
experimental and quasi-experimental methods to evaluate policy reform, particularly with 
application to labour market, education and training policies. Such approaches have not been  27
applied in the area of savings policies and yet such methods, coupled with adequate measures of 
both saving in various forms and of consumption expenditures, would seem a promising direction 
for evaluating tax incentives more formally. As new data sources, which include important 
information on household financial behaviour and intertemporal choices (such as the HRS 
AHEAD in the US and ELSA in the England) become available, the time is ripe for more work in 
this area. The role that will be played by these new and innovative data sources will be crucial. 
They represent a fundamental advance that was only developed in the last few years and that 
should be developed even further, both in terms of increasing the households covered by these 
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APPENDIX: ANALYSIS AT INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Table A1: Percentage of adults holding tax-free financial assets  
Age   <30 30s 40s 50s 60s 70+ All 
1998         
School leaving age  3.5  7.4  10.4  19.4  20.8  9.6  11.5
Age 18  7.3  15.2  18.4  33.4 37.8 24.5  22.5
Age 19+  11.7  25.0  34.6 49.7 57.6 50.9  30.2
All 6.4  13.1  18.7  28.3 29.6 15.8  17.9
         
2002         
School leaving age  8.9  15.4  19.3  28.6  33.4  23.0  21.4
Age 18  15.2  26.9  30.7  42.8 53.7 41.6  35.0
Age 19+  27.5  39.7  43.3 62.6 65.9 66.1  43.8
All 16.0  24.2  28.8  39.6 42.9 31.5  29.7
         
Percentage point 
increase:  
       
School leaving age  5.5  8.0  9.0  9.2  12.6  13.4  9.9
Age 18  7.9  11.7  12.3  9.4 15.9  17.1 12.5
Age 19+  15.8  14.7  8.6 12.9 8.3 15.3 13.6
All 9.6  11.1  10.1  11.4 13.2 15.7  11.8
Source : Authors’ analysis using the Family Resources Survey.  29
Table A2: Percentage of adults holding any financial assets other than a current account  
  Age group   
  <30 30s 40s 50s 60s 70+ All 
Age ceased education  1998   
School  leaving  age  41.2 53.1 54.6 63.3 66.7 67.6  57.5
Age 18  57.0  74.3  70.5  80.6 80.9 81.4  73.7
Age 19+  67.2  80.7  85.7 89.6 89.0 89.0  80.2
All 51.5  64.2  67.9  72.8 73.4 72.6  66.4
         
 2002   
School  leaving  age  35.8 52.1 53.7 61.2 64.0 65.8  55.7
Age 18  49.8  69.8  68.9  76.7 80.3 77.6  70.7
Age 19+  63.2  77.2  80.8 88.5 89.8 91.0  77.5
All 47.5 62.6 65.3 71.7 71.6 71.0 64.4
         
  Percentage point increase:   
School  leaving  age  -5.4 -1.0 -0.8 -2.1 -2.8 -1.8  -1.8
Age  18  -7.2 -4.5 -1.6 -3.9 -0.6 -3.8  -3.0
Age  19+  -3.9 -3.6 -5.0 -1.1 0.9  1.9  -2.7
All  -3.9 -1.6 -2.6 -1.1 -1.8 -1.5  -2.5
Source : Authors’ analysis using the Family Resources Survey.  30
Table A3: Percentage of adults living in families holding more than £1500 in financial assets 
  Age group   
  <30 30s 40s 50s 60s 70+ All 
Age ceased education  1998   
School  leaving  age  16.6 31.1 36.9 53.4 63.0 62.2  43.1
Age 18  24.6  49.5  54.2  71.0 79.9 77.3  58.3
Age 19+  37.4  64.0  75.5 81.3 86.7 91.0  64.2
All 24.1  43.3  52.7  63.6 71.0 68.3 51.8 
         
 2002   
School  leaving  age  16.5 35.6 41.6 55.9 64.1 65.3  46.8
Age 18  23.9  52.7  59.1  72.3 80.8 81.1  61.7
Age 19+  39.6  67.5  75.1 85.4 91.6 94.2  67.5
All 25.7  47.9  55.8  67.5 72.3 72.3  55.7
         
  Percentage point increase:   
School  leaving  age -0.1 4.5 4.7 2.5 1.1 3.1  3.7
Age  18  -0.7 3.2 4.9 1.3 0.9 3.8  3.4
Age  19+  2.2 3.5 -0.4 4.1 4.9 3.2  3.3
All 1.6  4.6  3.1  3.9 1.3 4.0  3.9
Source : Authors’ analysis using the Family Resources Survey.  31
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Figure 4.1 























































































Figure 4.3: Percentage of the population living in families with more 


























Source: Authors’ analysis of Family Resources Survey, various years.  34
 



























Compulsory schooling only Upto 18 19+ All
 
Note: These averages do disguise some change in the proportion in each group that are saving positive 
amounts. However, although there is a general upward trend in the proportion of savers during the early years 
of the data, this levels off before ISAs were introduced: for all groups 1998 marks the peak in the series for the 
proportions of savers. 
Source: Authors’ analysis of the British Household Panel Survey, various years. 
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1 One exception to this stability in the savings environment was the introduction of Stakeholder Pensions in 2001. 
However, since these accounts allow for saving that cannot be accessed until one starts taking a pension 
income stream (certainly after age 50), they are a very imperfect substitute for ISAs. Further, early 
evidence of very limited take-up of Stakeholder Pensions by new pension savers (i.e. those who would not 
have had some form of pension in the absence of the new product) suggests that this change in the savings 
environment is unlikely to affect the results in our analysis.  
2 PEPs also attracted a “dividend tax credit”, as subsequently did ISAs. For an example explaining the relative 
generosity of the credit in the two policies, see Banks and Tanner, 1999, pp. 91-2, and/or Table 5 of 
Emmerson and Tanner (2000).   
3 More could be saved if a “single company PEP” was held alongside a general PEP. 
4 An inland revenue press release (http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/budget97/ir4.html) produced when the 
policy was first proposed said that “the new scheme will have a particular emphasis on encouraging those 
on low incomes to save”. 
5 Excluding the sparsely populated Scottish islands and area north of the Caledonian Canal. More information on the 
FRS can be found at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/frs/. 
6 Throughout this section the term “family” refers to the unit of assessment for state benefits, which will be either a 
single adult or an adult couple, plus any dependent school aged children that live with the adult unit. 
7 The similarity to the family analysis is even closer is one works at a household level. This is because the majority of 
UK households contain only one benefit unit (family). Household level analysis is available from the 
authors on request. 
8 This number is derived using the Retail Prices Index for the middle month (September) of each year of our data. 
9 Note that since 1997, there have been a number of non-representative sub-samples added to the BHPS sample. We 
do not use these households in our analysis. More information on the BHPS can be found at 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/doc/.   
10 In total, 62% of respondents who gave a full interview at wave 1 (1991) were present in wave 10 (2000). 